Rabat, Morocco – October 7, 2025: The European Union’s 31.4% tariff on Chinese-backed Moroccan aluminium wheels represents a significant escalation in trade tensions between Europe and China, with Morocco caught in the middle of competing economic interests. The March 2025 tariff targeting Dika Morocco Africa SARL, a subsidiary of Chinese giant Citic Dicastal, marks the highest countervailing duty imposed by the EU on Moroccan exports, reflecting broader concerns about Chinese investment strategies in Africa and their impact on European markets.
The European Commission’s anti-subsidy investigation, initiated in February 2024, found that Moroccan aluminium wheel exports benefited from what Brussels deemed “WTO-incompatible subsidies,” including direct grants, preferential loans, and tax exemptions from the Moroccan government, as well as cross-border financing from China under the Belt and Road Initiative. The EU imposed differentiated tariffs: 5.6% for exporters benefiting solely from Moroccan subsidies and 31.4% for those receiving both Moroccan and Chinese BRI financial contributions.
Morocco signed its Belt and Road Initiative implementation agreement with China on January 5, 2022, making it the first North African country to formally commit to the program. This strategic partnership builds on earlier cooperation frameworks established in 2016 and 2017, when Morocco initially joined China’s BRI through a memorandum of understanding.
European Industry Concerns and Market Dynamics
The European Commission justified the tariffs by claiming that subsidized Moroccan imports caused injury to EU industry, with Moroccan market share in aluminium wheels increasing from 2% to 9% between 2020 and 2023. EU reports indicated that Moroccan wheel prices were approximately 16% lower than European producers, attributed to the subsidies under investigation.
Mario Conserva, Secretary General of the Federation of Aluminium Consumers in Europe (FACE), welcomed the European Commission’s decision, stating that the federation supports “international cooperation but no to distortive practices”. The European industry argued that approximately 16,600 jobs in the European aluminium sector were threatened by what they characterized as unfair competition.
These countervailing duties are in addition to anti-dumping tariffs ranging from 9% to 17.5% that the EU imposed on the same Moroccan aluminium wheels in January 2023. Similar measures are already in place against Chinese aluminium wheel imports.
Morocco’s Strategic Response and Trade Relations
Morocco’s government, through spokesperson Mustapha Baitas, responded that the EU partnership “cannot be subject to selective logic” and declared the government’s opposition to the European Commission’s surcharges. Baitas emphasized that Morocco views its relationship with the European Union as comprehensive and strategic, rejecting what Rabat perceives as discriminatory trade practices.
The trade dispute occurs within the broader context of Morocco’s significant commercial relationship with the European Union. Morocco is the EU’s 18th largest trade partner, representing 1.2% of the EU’s total global trade in goods in 2024, while the EU accounts for 59% of Morocco’s trade in goods. Total trade between the EU and Morocco amounted to €60.6 billion in 2024.
Chinese investment in Morocco has grown substantially in recent years. According to official Chinese data, China’s outward investment to Morocco reached $241.59 million in 2023, up from $1.58 million in 2022. Recent bilateral trade between Morocco and China reached approximately $9.04 billion in 2024, showing steady growth.
Western Sahara Complicates EU-Morocco Relations
The aluminium wheel dispute intersects with ongoing legal challenges regarding Western Sahara. On October 4, 2024, the European Court of Justice ruled that EU-Morocco trade agreements covering Western Sahara were invalid without the consent of the Sahrawi people. The court determined that Western Sahara is “separate and distinct” from Morocco and that any EU agreements affecting the territory require explicit Sahrawi consent.
Despite this ruling, the EU and Morocco signed a new trade agreement on October 2, 2025, that maintains preferential treatment for products from Western Sahara through amended labeling requirements. Products from Western Sahara will now be labeled with references to “Laâyoune-Sakia El Hamra” and “Dakhla-Oued Ed-Dahab,” the Moroccan administrative designations for the territory.
The Polisario Front condemned the new agreement as a “blatant violation of international law” and vowed to use “all appropriate legal means” to challenge it. The movement argues that the agreement enables Morocco’s continued occupation of Western Sahara and undermines the UN peace process.
This trade agreement controversy adds another layer of complexity to EU-Morocco relations, as European institutions navigate between legal obligations established by their own court and economic interests with a key North African partner. The European Commission faces criticism for allegedly circumventing judicial rulings while pursuing continued commercial engagement with Morocco.
The convergence of these issues – Chinese investment concerns, trade defense measures, and the Western Sahara legal dispute – illustrates the increasingly complex nature of contemporary international trade relations. Morocco’s position as a strategic gateway between Africa, Europe, and Asia places it at the center of competing interests among major powers, with economic partnerships becoming intertwined with broader geopolitical considerations.
As global supply chains continue to evolve and trade relationships face new pressures from industrial policy and security concerns, the Morocco-China-EU triangle exemplifies how traditional trading relationships must adapt to new realities of great power competition and changing patterns of international investment.
